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Overview
• What is a day-ahead electricity market?
• Market design issues for day-ahead markets
• Benefits of operating a day-ahead market
• Why was the original day-ahead market in NZEM abandoned?
• Areas in NZEM where a day-ahead market may offer benefits
• What would day-ahead prices for NZEM look like?
• Actual day-ahead prices for PJM
• Day-ahead markets at a subset of nodes
• Conclusions
What is a day-ahead market?
• Operates a day in advance of actual operating day
• Allows both ‘financial’ and ‘physical’ participation
• Distinct from real-time markets but linked by ‘two-settlement
system’
• Day-ahead price and quantity are ‘locked in’. Deviations
managed by real-time market
Two-settlement system: example
Buys 
forward 
20MW at 
$10/MW
Load
Sells 
forward 
20MW at 
$10/MW
Generator
Day-ahead mkt
Wed 3/9/03
1.30 - 2.00 am
Forward contract for 20MW
Real-time mkt
Thurs 4/9/03
1.30 - 2.00 am
Pays $200 
for forward 
contract
Paid $200 
for forward 
contract
Load Generator
Sells 5MW at 
$9/MW
Buys 5MW at 
$9/MW
Actual delivery is only 15MWForward contract f r Actual delivery is l  Forward contract for 20MW
Total payment to generator = (20MW x $10) - (5MW x $9) = $155
Incentive-compatibility of two-settlement
system
• Two-settlement system is incentive-compatible in that
a generator has generally the same incentives in real-time
market as if day-ahead market didn’t exist
• Generator offers entire desired generation into real-time market.
Deviations or mistakes are managed by two-settlement system
• Symmetry means same incentives apply to electricity
purchasers for their desired load
Market design: centralised or decentralised
trading (1)
(Trading Institution?)
• Transaction costs: centralising saves transaction costs
Closer to real time – electricity product more homogeneous,
higher demand, more transactions
_trading platform to economise in transaction costs
_centralised trading may be more cost effective
     Further from real time – electricity products differ, lower
demand, fewer transactions
_higher transaction costs
_decentralised trading may be more cost effective
Market design: centralised or decentralised
trading (2)
(Trading Institution?)
• Information Exchange
• Winner’s Curse:
Common values _ winner’s curse, affects bidding/offering
In electricity pay-as-bid auction, common value is price 
guessed.
Winner’s curse _ submit higher offers
• Forward markets
reveal information on common values so helps solve winner’s
curse problem _ lower offers
Centralised trading reveals information to more participants 
Market design: uniform-price or pay-as-bid (1)
(Complementary?)
• Uniform-price – generators all paid market-clearing price
Pay-as-bid – generators all paid what they offer
• Bidding behaviour:
Competitive uniform-price – offer at marginal cost
Pay-as-bid – offer at estimated price of electricity
• Potential Problems:
Uniform-price – can be affected by exercise of market power
Pay-as-bid – no dispatch order and large generators may have
more resources to forecast price
Market design: uniform-price or pay-as-bid
(2): Complementary Markets?
• Combination of uniform-price real-time and pay-as-bid day-
ahead may improve price discovery.
• Why?
In real-time, uniform-price provides least-cost dispatch order
In day-ahead, dispatch order is not needed, and pay-as-bid may
limit incentives for exercise of market power
• Note virtual bidding (arbitrage) => the average price in each
market should be the same but be affected by the DA Mkt
presence
Gaming the two markets
(Robert Michaels, 2003)
• At high loads, supply curve becomes very steep
• Demand-side can exercise market power:
Understate load to achieve a lower day-ahead price, while
making up the shortfall in the real-time market
• Requires:
– no virtual bidding
– uniform-price auction in both markets
Gaming the two markets
• Ways to counter this:
1. Allow virtual bidding: generators submit a virtual load bid to
counter understated load.
This arbitrage across markets drives prices to converge
2. Allow a pay-as-bid day-ahead market: flat supply curve
limits the incentive to understate load
Benefits of day-ahead markets
• Increase reliability/certainty
• Promote demand-side participation
• Assist in unit-commitment
• Reduce impact of price uncertainty/volatility
• Reduce incentive for gaming
A day-ahead market in NZEM?
Already tried and abandoned!
• ECNZ required to have 87% of capacity hedged in 1997
• Duopoly _ less competition
• Quick-start hydro-generation
 _ reliability and unit-commitment not such a problem
Possible reasons:
•   Low price volatility
A day-ahead market in NZEM?
Already tried and abandoned!
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A day-ahead market in NZEM?
Times have changed!
Potential benefits in areas of:
• Demand-side participation
• Impact of price volatility
• Incentives for gaming
• Must-run generation
• Volatility on a river chain
• Administrative costs
Forecast of day-ahead prices in NZEM
• If DA market existed, how would prices compare with RT?
• For any node, for trading period i and day t estimate:
• Use estimates to forecast day-ahead prices
• Guthrie and Videbeck (2002) _ forecasting prices from same
trading period on the day before is reasonable
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Is this a reasonable approach?
• Try where both a day-ahead and real-time market already exist
• PJM in Northeastern United States operates both day-ahead
and real-time markets
• Following graph shows there is some merit in our approach
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Results of the forecasting experiment
• In NZEM, forecast day-ahead prices less volatile than real-time
prices
 Mean ($/MWh) Standard Deviation ($/MWh) 
Year Real-time 
Prices 
Forecast Day-ahead 
Prices 
Real-time 
Prices 
Forecast Day-ahead 
Prices 
2001 79.85 79.85 84.20 54.58 
2002 40.16 40.16 29.32 7.04 
 
• In PJM, actual day-ahead prices relative to real time prices
• Have the same mean
• are less volatile,
• Have a less skewed and peaked distribution
Results of the forecasting experiment: PJM
(April 2003)
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Transactions and markets at different nodes
• Day-ahead markets need not operate at all nodes
• Fewer day-ahead nodes may give more participation at these
nodes
• Example:
A B
Day-ahead 
and Real-
time market
Real-time 
market only
C
Example: markets at different nodes
Load
Buys 
forward 
20MW at 
$10/MW
Day-ahead mkt
Wed 3/9/03
1.30 - 2.00 am
Node A
(has both mkts)
-$200
Total payment by load = -(20MW x $10) + (20MW x $12) -(20MW x $14)= -$240
Real-time mkt
Thurs 4/9/03
1.30 - 2.00 am
Sells back 
20MW at 
A's real-
time price
($12/MW)
Buys 
20MW at 
B's real-
time price
($14/MW)
Load
$240 -$280
Node A
(has both mkts)
Node B
(has RT mkt only)
Total payment by load = -(20MW x  ( 0 W x $12) -(20MW x $14)= -$240Tot l   load = -(20MW x $10) + (20MW x $12) -(20   
Markets at different nodes and FTRs
• Day-ahead market at A provides a hedge for volatile real-time
prices at B
• But only if real-time prices at A and B are ‘similar’
• Guthrie and Videbeck (2003):
_ prices are similar over upper North Island, lower North Island
and South Island _ suggests 2 or 3 day-ahead markets
• Financial Transmission Rights may complement day-ahead
markets by limiting intra node volatility over longer periods
Conclusions
• Day-ahead markets are not a necessity but do provide
additional benefits
• As it is close to real-time, a centralised trading day-ahead
market may be more effective than a decentralised one
• The combination of pay-as-bid day-ahead market and uniform
real-time market may improve price discovery
• Although tried and abandoned, times have changed and a day-
ahead market in NZEM would offer benefits in some key areas
• Day ahead markets are forward markets
